


## OBJECTIVES

Distributed learning tasks using distributed data:

- different data owners/locality
- common computational objective
- privacy concerns over sharing data

**Goal:** accomplish computational tasks distributedly while providing privacy guarantee.



## PRELIMINARIES

Regularized Empirical Risk Minimization:

$$\min_{f_c} O_{ERM}(f_c, \{D_i\}_{i=1}^N) = \sum_{i=1}^N O(f_c, D_i)$$

with  $O(f_c, D_i) = \frac{C}{B_i} \sum_{n=1}^{B_i} \mathcal{L}(y_i^n f_c^T x_i^n) + \frac{\rho}{N} R(f_c)$

Decentralize ERM:

$$\min_{\{f_i\}, \{w_{ij}\}} \tilde{O}_{ERM}(\{f_i\}_{i=1}^N, D_{all}) = \sum_{i=1}^N O(f_i, D_i)$$


s.t.  $f_i = w_{ij}, w_{ij} = f_j, i \in \mathcal{N}, j \in \mathcal{V}_i$

Simplified Alternating Direction Method of Multiplier:

- Initialize dual variables:  $\lambda_{ij}^a(0) = \lambda_{ij}^b(0) = 0$ . Let  $\lambda_i(t) = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{V}_i} \lambda_{ij}^a(t) = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{V}_i} \lambda_{ij}^b(t)$

Primal update:  $f_i(t+1) = \operatorname{argmin}_{f_i} \{O(f_i, D_i) + 2\lambda_i(t)^T f_i + \eta \sum_{j \in \mathcal{V}_i} \|f_i - \frac{1}{2}(f_i(t) + f_j(t))\|_2^2\}$ ;


Dual update:  $\lambda_i(t+1) = \lambda_i(t) + \frac{\eta}{2} \sum_{j \in \mathcal{V}_i} (f_i(t+1) - f_j(t+1))$ .



Differential Privacy: obtain almost the same conclusion regardless of participation  $\frac{\Pr(M(D) \in S)}{\Pr(M(D') \in S)} \leq \exp(\epsilon)$

## EXISTING WORK & LIMITATION

Two randomizations were proposed [1]:



Issues:



1. Privacy loss only evaluated for a single node for one iteration.
2. Privacy leakage accumulates over many iterations; hard to balance privacy and utility simply by summing up privacy losses.

## MODIFIED ADMM & PENALTY PERTURBATION

Modified ADMM: explore the use of penalty parameter  $\eta$ ; allow this to be private information.

Modified primal update:  $f_i(t+1) = \operatorname{argmin}_{f_i} \{O(f_i, D_i) + 2\lambda_i(t)^T f_i + \eta_i(t+1) \sum_{j \in \mathcal{V}_i} \|f_i - \frac{1}{2}(f_i(t) + f_j(t))\|_2^2\}$ ;

Modified dual update:  $\lambda_i(t+1) = \lambda_i(t) + \frac{\theta}{2} \sum_{j \in \mathcal{V}_i} (f_i(t+1) - f_j(t+1))$ .



Penalty Perturbation (PP): generalizes Dual Variable Perturbation (DVP)

$$f_i(t+1) = \operatorname{argmin}_{f_i} \{O(f_i, D_i) + 2\lambda_i(t)^T f_i + \eta_i(t+1) \sum_{j \in \mathcal{V}_i} \|\text{noise} + f_i - \frac{1}{2}(f_i(t) + f_j(t))\|_2^2\}$$

## NUMERICAL RESULTS

Real world dataset: Adult dataset

Accuracy:  $L(t) := \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \frac{1}{B_i} \sum_{n=1}^{B_i} \mathcal{L}(y_i^n f_i(t)^T x_i^n)$

Privacy:  $P(t) := \max_{i \in \mathcal{N}} \{\sum_{r=1}^t \frac{C(1.4c_1 + \alpha_i(r))}{\eta_i(r) V_i B_i}\}$

Parameter setting:

$$\eta_i(t+1) = \theta q_1^t = \begin{cases} q_1 = 1, & \text{DVP} \\ q_1 \geq 1, & \text{PP} \end{cases}; \alpha_i(t+1) = \alpha q_2^t$$

Network: small (five-node) and large (hundreds of nodes); with even and uneven distributed sample.




Figure 3: Accuracy:  $\alpha = 3$




Figure 1: Privacy:  $\alpha = 3$

Figure 2: Privacy:  $\alpha = 5$




Figure 4: Accuracy:  $\alpha = 5$

## MAIN RESULTS

Convergence Analysis (non-private)

- Condition for convergence of modified ADMM:  $0 < \theta \leq \eta_i(t) \leq \eta_i(t+1) < +\infty, \forall i, t$
- Quantify lower bound on the convergence rate: increasing  $\eta_i(t)$  slows down the rate

Privacy Analysis (private): the total privacy loss during T iterations

$$\ln \left( \frac{\Pr(\{\{f_i(t)\}_{i=1}^N\}_{t=0}^T \in S|D)}{\Pr(\{\{f_i(t)\}_{i=1}^N\}_{t=0}^T \in S|D')} \right) \leq \max_{i \in \mathcal{N}} \left\{ \sum_{t=1}^T \frac{C(1.4c_1 + \alpha_i(t))}{\eta_i(t) V_i B_i} \right\}$$

## CONCLUSIONS

Better performance and stronger privacy can be obtained **simultaneously** by increasing  $\eta_i(t)$ .

The improvement is more significant with higher privacy requirement.

## REFERENCES

[1] Tao Zhang and Quanyan Zhu. Dynamic differential privacy for admm-based distributed classification learning. *IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security*, 12(1):172–187, 2017.